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Rockwell International, Pondcrete, and an A La Carte
Three-Step Test for Determining an “Original
Source” in Qui Tam Lawsuits
In 1999, George Couto, a former Bayer marketing executive,
attended a management meeting on ethics.1 As he compared Bayer’s
practices in the marketing department with the ethical principles
discussed in the meeting, he grew increasingly uncomfortable with
the prices the company charged Medicaid for some of its
pharmaceutical products. Ignored by management, he decided to file
a civil suit in federal district court on behalf of the United States.
The lawsuit he initiated led to a $257 million dollar settlement for
the taxpayers, a small portion of which he and his lawyers kept for
blowing the whistle.2 Mr. Cuoto’s situation is not isolated.
The United States will spend a staggering $2.918 trillion in the
2008 fiscal year.3 Of that amount, the government will pay a
significant portion to companies providing goods and services via
government contracts. In the immense federal acquisitions
bureaucracy, some of those companies will seek to defraud taxpayers,
and the resulting government payments made to these companies
will become needles in the budget haystack. Well-meaning
whistleblowers are often the taxpayers’ first line of defense—by
alerting the Justice Department of alleged fraud, they help ferret out

1. QuiTamHelp.com, Why Become a Whistleblower?, http://quitamhelp.com/
static/stories/stories.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2008). Couto explained in a deposition why he
blew the whistle:
I continuously got more uneasy as the private labeling program expanded, as more
people learned about it, as Bayer began to use it almost as a routine marketing
practice. It was one drug and then it was two drugs and now it’s three drugs . . . I
attended a compliance training program in February of [1999], I’m told by Joe
D’Arco, our lead counsel, and I’m told by [CEO] Helge Wehmeier on video to not
only follow the letter of the law but the spirit of the law as well. So here I am, a
market manager with full knowledge and awareness of a program that clearly is not
within the spirit of the law at a minimum . . . It’s the only ethical thing to do.
Id.
2. QuiTamHelp.com, Executive Whistleblowers, http://quitamhelp.com/static/
popup/article_01.html#bayer (last visited Oct. 8, 2008).
3. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MIDSESSION REVIEW: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOV’T, FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 15 (2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/08msr.pdf.
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the needle. The False Claims Act (“FCA”) authorizes these lawsuits,4
which are commonly referred to as qui tam actions—qui tam are the
first two words of the Latin phrase describing the English law that
allowed a private party to file a lawsuit on behalf of the government.5
Not every qui tam action results in a large recovery for taxpayers,
but the combined efforts of whistleblowers are the basis for the
majority of recovered funds. During the fiscal year ending September
30, 2007, the United States recovered $2 billion from companies
either accused of or found guilty of defrauding the government.6 Of
this total, whistleblowers initiated lawsuits that led to $1.45 billion
in settlements and judgments against these companies,7 a figure that
represents 72.5% of the total recoveries.
Despite whistleblower success in qui tam actions, it may be more
difficult than necessary to bring these cases to trial because the
language of the FCA is, in many instances, ambiguous. This fact is
unfortunate for the Justice Department because it makes litigation
more difficult and expensive than it needs to be. It is also
unfortunate for whistleblowers and their attorneys who face the
prospects of financing the law’s clarification. Jurisdictions have
interpreted the Act’s language differently, causing various circuit
court splits. The consequence of these splits has been inconsistent
application of the law to similar fact situations and the related vice of
forum shopping by whistleblowers and their counsel.8 One such
circuit court split which has particular forum shopping incentive is
the meaning of the legislative phrase “direct and independent
knowledge.” In short, when a case of fraud on the federal
government has been made public, the law bars jurisdiction of a qui
4. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–31 (2000).
5. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *125, *161–62 (explaining that “qui
tam” derives from the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege, etc. quam pro se ipso in hac parte
sequitur: “who prosecutes this suit as well [as] for the king, etc. as for himself”).
6. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Dep’t Recovers $2 Billion for Fraud
Against the Gov’t in Fy 2007; More than $20 Billion Since 1986 (Nov. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/November/07_civ_873.html.
7. Id.
8. Forum shopping leads to inefficiency by preventing out-of-court settlements and,
philosophically, makes the legal system seem susceptible to manipulation. It is more famously
seen in the world of patent litigation. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent
Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 893–94 (2001)
(arguing that forum shopping shows that the promise of justice is unattainable and that it is
economically inefficient because, by preventing accurate forecasting of the outcome of
litigation, forum shopping prevents parties from settling out of court).
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tam claim unless the claimant had “direct and independent
knowledge” of the alleged fraud.9 As such, qui tam claimants have
great incentive to file in a court where their claim may survive a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In 2007, the Supreme
Court decided Rockwell International Corp. v. United States, an FCA
case that, while not resolving every circuit split, may provide some
guidance to aid in determining whether a court may assert
jurisdiction over a whistleblower’s case. The thesis of this Comment
is that Rockwell’s reasoning created a three-step, a la carte test that
enables the circuit courts to apply a predictable jurisdictional
standard to whistleblowers’ suits. When applying the proposed threestep test, circuit courts need only apply the applicable portions of the
test, thus eliminating unnecessary changes to current case law
beyond what has already been established by Rockwell.
This Comment proceeds by introducing the legislative and
historical context of qui tam actions under the FCA in Part I. Part II
summarizes the circuit court split on the meaning of the phrase
“direct and independent knowledge.” Part III applies Rockwell’s
holding to the split to show that “independent” no longer has a
discrete meaning from “direct” and that “knowledge” could now
include a prediction. Part IV proposes a three-step test that would
resolve the circuit court split while staying true to Rockwell.
I.

UNDERSTANDING THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT

During the Civil War, Congress enacted the FCA to encourage
government contractors to bill honestly despite a lack of government
oversight.10 The FCA allows a private party, or relator, to sue a
government contractor for fraud on behalf of the government and to
keep a portion of any award recovered.11 Theoretically, the FCA
encouraged contractor employees to betray co-conspirators in order
to collect a portion of the government’s recovery, thereby making up
for inadequate policing during a time of war by “setting a rogue to
catch a rogue.”12 Unfortunately, Congress used vague language in
the FCA, and in 1943, the Supreme Court interpreted the Act to
9. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(b) (2000).
10. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 4, 12 Stat. 698 (1863) (current version at 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729–31).
11. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–31 (2000). The FCA effectively allows any relator to become an
attorney general for the United States.
12. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955–96 (1863).

1245

LUND.FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

10/11/2008 1:47 PM

[2008

allow private litigants to bring civil suits on behalf of the government
even if the relator had done no more than copy the complaint from
published criminal indictments.13 Predictably, attorneys nationwide
began to file parasitic qui tam civil suits—parasitic because the
attorney obtained all the information for the civil suit from a criminal
indictment by the Justice Department. This problem siphoned funds
that would otherwise have been returned to the taxpayers into the
private coffers of these attorneys, which provided incentive for
congressional action. Within months, Congress amended the FCA to
bar qui tam suits “based upon evidence or information in the
possession of the United States”—an effort to curtail parasitic civil
suits in those cases where the government already had the
information it needed to pursue a civil action.14
This congressional remedy had its own problems, however. Over
time, the number of qui tam suits decreased markedly, and as it did,
government contractors more frequently engaged in fraudulent
activities involving increasingly higher dollar amounts.15 This version
of the FCA went too far, “kill[ing] the goose that laid the golden
egg”: a whistleblower could no longer inform government
enforcement agencies of false claims and successfully file a qui tam
complaint because once the government had the information from
the whistleblower, the courts dismissed the relator’s civil case.16
Effectively, these precedents cut off the FCA’s monetary incentive
for an insider to blow the whistle on his company. In 1986,
Congress decided to change course again to encourage

13. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 546–47 (1943).
14. Act of Dec. 23, 1943, 57 Stat. 608 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1976)).
15. The False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266–302 [hereinafter Senate Report].
Evidence of fraud in Government programs and procurement is on a steady rise. In
1984, the Department of Defense conducted 2,311 fraud investigations, up 30
percent from 1982. Similarly, the Department of Health and Human Services has
nearly tripled the number of entitlement program fraud cases referred for
prosecution over the past 3 years. Detected fraud is, of course, an imprecise measure
of how much actual fraud exists. The General Accounting Office in a 1981 study
found that ‘most fraud goes undetected.’ Of the fraud that is detected, the study
states, the Government prosecutes and recovers its money in only a small percentage
of cases . . . . The Department of Justice has estimated fraud as draining 1 to 10
percent of the entire Federal budget.
Id. at 2–3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5266–68.
16. United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 680
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
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whistleblowers by repealing the “government knowledge” bar and
replacing it with the current “public disclosure” bar, which allowed
an “original source” to file a qui tam compliant even if the
allegations of the false claim were available to the public.17 According
to the language of the 1986 amendment, an “original source” is one
who “has direct and independent knowledge of the information on
which the allegations are based.”18 By this change, Congress hoped
to find the right balance between encouraging whistleblowers and
preventing parasitic suits.
Courts have struggled to interpret the 1986 amendment,19
however, and its ambiguities further muddled qui tam litigation.
Due, at least in part, to the poor drafting of the statute, the circuits
have split on interpretation of the FCA. A current split exists in
regards to the original source exception to the public disclosure bar
that blatantly encourages forum shopping.20
The Supreme Court waded into the bog by taking a qui tam
case, Rockwell International Corp. v. United States,21 in the 2006–07
term, which clarified at least two circuit court splits, but left others
alive and well.22 Of those alive and well is the issue of how much
“direct and independent knowledge” a qui tam relator must have in
order to be an original source.23 The courts of appeals have defined
“direct” in similar terms, but definitions of “independent” vary:
some have held that it has a separate meaning from direct, while
17. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
18. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2000). The details of this definition are often litigated.
See discussion infra Part II.
19. See, e.g., Tipton F. McCubbins & Tara I. Fitzgerald, As False Claim Penalties
Mount, Defendants Scramble for Answers: Qui Tam Liability, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., 62 BUS.
LAW. 103, 125 (2006) (“[N]o two circuit courts of appeals who have been called upon to
apply the [original source] definition seem to have interpreted it in exactly the same manner.”).
20. See discussion infra Part II.B.
21. 127 S. Ct. 1397, 1410 (2007).
22. Aaron P. Silberman & David F. Innis, The Supreme Court Raids the Public Disclosure
Bar: Cleaning Up After Rockwell International v. United States, 42 PROCUREMENT LAW. 1, 1
(2007). Silberman and Innis point out that among the still unsettled qui tam issues are:
“sufficiency of public disclosure to trigger the jurisdictional bar; quantum of direct and
independent knowledge necessary to be an original source; and whether a relator must have
been the catalyst for a public disclosure in order to qualify as an original source.” Id. at 20.
23. United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 686
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (identifying six circuit splits based on phrases from the FCA). Judge Wald,
writing for the majority, asserts that despite the disagreement in the circuit courts, they do all
agree that “the language of the statute is not so plain as to clearly describe which cases
Congress intended to bar.” Id. at 681.
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others have applied a definition that roughly collapses the two terms
together.24 Rockwell’s holding does not specifically adopt definitions,
but its analysis points to a consolidated definition and introduces the
idea that a prediction could qualify as “knowledge.” In this way,
Rockwell extinguishes the separate meanings for the terms “direct”
and “independent.”
II. “DIRECT AND INDEPENDENT KNOWLEDGE” TESTS IN THE
CIRCUIT COURTS
Whether the 1986 amendment’s public disclosure bar and
original source exception were jurisdictional was unsettled for a
time,25 but in Rockwell the Supreme Court clearly holds that the
public disclosure bar, at least, is jurisdictional.26 This means that
when the public disclosure bar applies, it removes subject matter
jurisdiction, and it takes effect on a claim-by-claim basis instead of on
a case-by-case basis,27 unless the attorney general or a relator who
qualifies as an original source brings the action. Thus the bar may
result in dismissing only some claims of a relator, leaving the case to
continue in litigation. Although Rockwell clearly held that the public
disclosure bar was jurisdictional, the case had a complicated and
unique fact pattern that may affect its precedential value regarding
specific circuit court splits.28 One complex split still exists regarding
the public disclosure bar: how the courts decide if a relator is an
“original source.”
A. The FCA’s Public Disclosure Bar and the Original Source Exception
By passing the 1986 amendments to the FCA, Congress hoped
to encourage whistleblowers to report fraud against the government
and to bar parasitic lawsuits by litigants who discovered fraud via a

24. See discussion infra Part II.B.
25. Compare Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 951
(1997) (stating that the 1986 amendment “creates jurisdiction where none previously
existed”), with United States ex rel. Fallon v. Accudyne Corp., 97 F.3d 937, 940–41 (7th Cir.
1996) (observing that “jurisdiction is a notoriously plastic term” and holding that the public
disclosure bar does not destroy subject matter jurisdiction).
26. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1405–06 (considering the arguments for and against before
holding that the public disclosure bar is jurisdictional).
27. Id. at 1410 (concluding that the FCA applies to qui tam actions on a claim-by-claim
basis because to hold otherwise would permit “claim smuggling”).
28. See id. at 1401.
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third party or intermediary.29 Taking advantage of the statute, many
whistleblowers have filed suit and their cases have created a
substantial, though varied, case history. Most litigation involving the
FCA has dealt with the public disclosure bar30 and often with the
specific issue of whether the putative relator truly qualifies as an
“original source.” The FCA provides:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this
section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting
Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the
news media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney
General or the person bringing the action is an original
source of the information.31
This statutory provision preserves jurisdiction in all cases when
the attorney general brings the suit, but complicates jurisdiction for a
qui tam relator. Courts often must decide if a “public disclosure” has
occurred, and the circuits have reached different outcomes on similar
fact patterns. For example, the Second and Third Circuits have held
that allegations resulting from information obtained through
discovery in a civil case were publicly disclosed; but the Seventh,
Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits have held that
allegations resulting from the same type of information were not
publicly disclosed, but only became potentially available to the
public.32 Because the resolution of this issue determines jurisdiction,
this split encourages forum shopping.
29. Senate Report, supra note 15, at 13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5278.
30. See ROBIN PAGE WEST, ADVISING THE QUI TAM WHISTLEBLOWER: FROM
IDENTIFYING A CASE TO FILING UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 10 (2001) (“[T]he ‘public
disclosure bar’ is the most confusing and most-often litigated” part of the FCA that makes
claims non-actionable.); Silberman & Innis, supra note 22, at 1 (asserting that the public
disclosure bar is “the most important, most litigated, affirmative defense to qui tam actions”).
31. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
32. WEST, supra note 30, at 10–11. For cases in which discovery in a civil trial is public
disclosure, see United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs., 985 F.2d 1148,
1157–58 (2d Cir. 1993); United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1158 (3d Cir. 1991). For cases in which discovery in a
civil trial is not public disclosure, see United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 860
(7th Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Schumer v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 63 F.3d 1512, 1519–
20 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated, 520 U.S. 939 (1997); United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century
Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 1514, 1519 (10th Cir. 1996); United States ex rel. Springfield
Terminal Ry., v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 652–53 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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If a public disclosure has occurred, the court must confront
another difficult issue: deciding what Congress specifically intended
by allowing an “original source” to bring a qui tam suit when the
fraud had previously been publicly disclosed. In formulating the
statutory definition, Congress tried to remedy the problem of the
“government knowledge” test and to protect whistleblowers’ qui
tam suits,33 so courts are rightly concerned about getting the
standard correct. The FCA defines an “original source” as “an
individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the
information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily
provided the information to the Government before filing an action
under this section which is based on the information.”34
Almost every phrase in the definition has generated its own case
history,35 including “direct and independent knowledge.” Although
circuit splits exist, since the change in law the number of qui tam
suits has increased and qui tam relators have collected larger
amounts in damages, suggesting that the pendulum has shifted in
the direction of discouraging corporate silence and encouraging
more whistleblowers.36 This may indicate that those knowing of
fraud against the government are increasingly deciding to report the
wrongdoing and that they are doing so when more money is at
stake.37 Standardizing the existing FCA jurisprudence may further
this trend, thereby making the FCA a more effective tool to protect
the fiscal resources of our national government. One necessary step is
to standardize the amount of “direct and independent knowledge” a
relator must have in order to be an original source.

33. Senate Report, supra note 15, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5269 (noting
that the “original source” definition should permit suits by “individuals who are either close
observers or otherwise involved in the fraudulent activity”).
34. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2000).
35. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d
675, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Predictably, these jurisdictional provisions . . . have led to
extensive litigation and to circuit splits concerning the meaning of the words ‘based upon,’
‘public disclosure,’ ‘allegations or transactions,’ ‘original source,’ ‘direct and independent
knowledge’ and ‘information.’”); PROCUREMENT FRAUD COMMITTEE, ABA, QUI TAM
LITIGATION UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 48–52 (2d ed. 1999) (examining the various
definitions of “original source” in court holdings).
36. McCubbins & Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 103.
37. The statute also controls the awarding of damages to a successful qui tam relator. In
short, the relator receives between 10 and 25 percent if the government intervenes in the suit,
and between 25 and 30 percent if the government does not. The court reduces that amount if
the relator planned or initiated the fraud. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3) (2000).
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B. The Circuit Split on “Direct and Independent Knowledge”
Each word in the phrase “direct and independent knowledge”
has been litigated, and the circuit courts differ so much with regard
to “independent” that there is no true “majority” test.38 This section
categorizes the circuit splits by analyzing how courts have analyzed
“direct and independent knowledge.” Some courts have analyzed the
two adjectives separately, while others have only one test for the
phrase “direct and independent.” Because of the split, the current
circuit court jurisprudence resolves similar factual scenarios
differently. In one circuit, a relator’s knowledge might be considered
direct but not independent; in another, it might be independent but
not direct. In addition, some circuits might hold that the relator’s
knowledge is both direct and independent but that the relator is still
not an original source because he did not cause the public disclosure.
A complete summary of the circuit court splits in this area is beyond
the scope of this Comment,39 but it is enough to consider the four
categories into which the circuits’ approaches fall.
The circuit courts agree in their interpretations of “direct.”
Generally, “direct knowledge” is “marked by absence of an
intervening agency, instrumentality or influence,”40 or “gained by
the relator’s own efforts and not acquired from the labor of
others.”41 The central idea is that for a relator to be an “original
source,” he must have obtained knowledge of the information in his
complaint, or of publicly disclosed information, without the aid of an
intermediary. So, for example, if employee A reads a document at
work and discovers fraud through his reading, this conduct would

38. McCubbins & Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 124–125. The authors categorize the
circuits into four schools of thought, with the Tenth Circuit being alone in its approach, using
the courts’ interpretations of “direct and independent knowledge” as the major differentiation
for each school. Id.
39. For such a summary, see McCubbins & Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 124–25.
40. United States ex rel. Minn. Assoc. of Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d 1032, 1048–49
(citing United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
944 F.2d 1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1991)).
41. United States ex rel. Hafter v. Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc., 190 F.3d 1156,
1161 (10th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 2001)
(asserting that the government/relator must show (1) a fraudulent claim (2) presented by the
defendant to the United States for approval, and (3) that the defendant knew the claim was
false); United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Servs., 163 F.3d 516, 526 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that a relator who only alleges the fraud, but who cannot offer individual
knowledge as proof, is not an original source).
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satisfy the test for direct knowledge because it is an unaided, firsthand effort. If, however, employee B writes a report detailing the
fraudulent situation and later asks A to read it for errors, then A is
not an original source because his effort was helped by a third party,
B, who first discovered the fraud, so A’s information is secondhand.
In circuits where there is no distinction between the terms
“independent” and “direct,” this test would satisfy “independent” as
well.
Of the four split categories, the first two groups differ in that the
Sixth, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits generally do not
allow the relator to be an original source where the public disclosure
occurred before the relator reported to the government, while the
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits will still allow
the relator be an original source in such a circumstance. In general
the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have not worried too much
about separate definitions for “direct” and “independent,” instead
treating them as a cohesive phrase, but in the Second and Ninth
Circuits the relator must satisfy a third requirement, that of having
caused the public disclosure.
In circuits holding that “information” refers to the allegations in
the relator’s complaint, the terms “direct” and “independent” have a
combined meaning.42 For these courts, the meaning of “direct and
independent” collapses into what is substantially the same meaning
as “direct”: “unmediated by anything but [the relator’s] own
labor.”43 Moreover, while some of these courts address each term
separately, the definition they assign to “independent” is that the
knowledge is “not derivative of the information of others.”44 Defined
as such, there is really no distinction between the meaning of
“independent” and “direct”—both terms would require the qui tam
relator to have firsthand knowledge of the fraud.45 Using this

42. Hafter, 190 F.3d at 1162–63. In Hafter, the Tenth Circuit held that to satisfy the
“direct and independent knowledge” requirement, a relator must offer more than
“secondhand information, speculation, background information or collateral research.” Id. The
relator “must allege specific facts . . . showing exactly how and when he or she obtained direct
and independent knowledge of the fraudulent acts alleged in the complaint and support those
allegations with complete proof.” Id.
43. Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1417 (9th Cir. 1992).
44. Hafter, 190 F.3d at 1161.
45. United States ex rel. Laird v. Lockheed Martin Eng’g & Sci. Servs. Co., 336 F.3d
346, 354–55 (5th Cir. 2003) (summarizing the definitions of the terms, then noting that
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construction, courts could provide one definition of “direct and
independent” and perform one analysis instead of performing two
analyses or defining both terms prior to performing one analysis.
Conversely, courts that have distinct definitions require two separate
analyses to make a determination.
In those circuits that have held that “information” refers to the
publicly disclosed allegations, the two terms do have discrete and
distinct definitions. “Direct” refers to information that is “first-hand
knowledge” obtained only through the relator’s efforts,46 as is the
case in the other circuits. In order to qualify as “independent,”
however, the relator’s information may not “derive[] from the public
disclosure.”47 This definition subtlety differentiates directness from
independence by examining the source of the knowledge against the
public disclosure.
In applying the words as a cohesive phrase—“direct and
independent” knowledge—the Second and Ninth Circuits require
the qui tam relator to have caused the public disclosure, if one exists,
in order to be an original source.48 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit
expressly held that a relator who had not revealed his knowledge of
fraud on the government until after the same information had been
disclosed was barred from bringing a qui tam suit even though his
knowledge was “direct and independent.”49 This takes the analysis a
step beyond the statutory language by looking to congressional
intent and the practical motivation for qui tam suits. The court
reasoned that if “direct and independent” means only first-hand
knowledge, then a person possessed of that knowledge has it for all
time. Therefore, even if a case of fraud has already been publicly
disclosed, a would-be relator possessing first-hand knowledge would
qualify as an original source because the “direct and independent”
“[w]e fail to see a distinction between these terms as so defined”), overruled in part by
Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397 (2007).
46. United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employee’s Club, 105 F.3d 675, 690
(D.C. Cir. 1997); see also United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp.,
985 F.2d 1148, 1159 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that knowledge of background information that
enables an understanding of the significance of publicly disclosed information does not qualify
a relator as an original source).
47. United States ex rel. Minn. Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp.,
276 F.3d 1032, 1048 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing United States ex rel. Barth v. Ridgedale Elec.,
Inc., 44 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1995).
48. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1418–20; United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting
Co., 912 F.2d 13, 16–18 (2d Cir. 1990).
49. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1417–18.
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test is satisfied. Of course, the value of this outcome is doubtful
because if the public knows of the fraud, the Attorney General no
longer needs a whistleblower to come forward—prosecutorial
attention has already been drawn. In such a case there is no hero
who saves the public from fraud, for a true whistleblower “sounds
the alarm; he does not echo it.”50 Congress wanted qui tam suits to
reward “those brave enough to speak in the face of a ‘conspiracy of
silence,’ and not their mimics” who have done nothing to break the
“conspiracy of silence.”51 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has inferred
a requirement from the statute that the relator be the whistleblower
in order to qualify for the exception. While this approach seems to
satisfy congressional intent, other circuits have expressly rejected it as
adding to the actual language of the statute.52
The following table summarizes the splits, although in some
jurisdictions there are cases that would blur bright boundaries:53

50. Id. at 1419.
51. Id. (quoting Senate Report, supra note 15, at 6).
52. See, e.g., Minn. Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1048 n.11 (“That rule would
perhaps be an improvement in the operation of the original source provision, but it has no
basis in the statutory language and we therefore decline to adopt it.”).
53. E.g., compare Wang, 975 F.2d at 1417 (holding that a relator’s knowledge “was
‘direct and independent’ because it was unmediated by anything but [the relator’s] own
labor”), with United States v. Alcan Elec. & Eng’g, Inc., 197 F.3d 1014, 1020–21 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that a relator’s knowledge was “independent” because it preceded the public
disclosure but was not direct because the relator obtained it through an intermediary).
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Table 1. Summary of Circuit Court Splits for “Direct and Independent”54
Circuit
Court
Group

Test for
“Direct”

Test for
“Independent”

6th, 7th, &
D.C.
Circuits55

Relator has
first-hand
knowledge

Relator is “the”
first source of
information

3d, 4th, 5th,
8th, & 11th
Circuits56

Relator
obtained
knowledge
without an
intermediary

Relator is “a”
source of
information

Test for
“Direct and
Independent”

10th
Circuit57

Relator has
first-hand
knowledge

2d & 9th
Circuits58

Relator
obtained
knowledge
without an
intermediary

Additional
Test

Relator
caused the
public
disclosure

The split over directness and independence causes forum
shopping. Consider again the situation of employees A and B, in
54. See McCubbins & Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 124–31.
55. United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-Boron Employees’ Club, 105 F.3d 675, 690
(D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 865 (7th Cir. 1999);
United States ex rel. McKenzie v. Bell South Telecomms., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 943 (6th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1077 (1998).
56. Minn. Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1042–43; Fed. Recovery Servs., Inc.
v. United States, 72 F.3d 447, 451–52 (5th Cir. 1995); Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 568 (11th Cir. 1994); United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton
Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1347 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 928 (1994);
United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A., v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944
F.2d 1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1991). Under this construction, relators can be an original source
even when they come to the government after the public disclosure; this is in direct conflict
with the Second and Ninth Circuits.
57. United States ex rel. Hafter v. Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc., 190 F.3d 1156,
1162 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Direct and independent knowledge is ‘marked by the absence of an
intervening agency . . . [and] unmediated by anything but the relator’s own labor.’” (quoting
United States ex rel. Fine v. MK-Ferguson Co., 99 F.3d 1538, 1547 (10th Cir. 1996))).
58. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1417–18; United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting
Co., 912 F.2d 13, 16–18 (2d Cir. 1990).
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which A has discovered a document written by B that details B’s
discovery of fraud. In the majority of the circuits, A fails the
directness test, but passes the independence test because her
knowledge does not derive from a public disclosure. Altering the
scenario slightly can yield the opposite result. If B publishes a
document that evidences fraud but does not recognize that the fraud
exists and A discovers the fraud by reading B’s published document,
then A’s knowledge satisfies the directness test because it is firsthand but fails the independence test because it derives from a public
disclosure. In this scenario only a court in the Tenth Circuit would
take jurisdiction over A’s qui tam complaint. If, however, employee
A was in charge of the publishing of B’s document, then jurisdiction
would also exist in the Second and Ninth Circuits.
Thus, based on its interpretation of the term “direct and
independent,” a federal court in one circuit might accept jurisdiction
over a qui tam action even though the courts of another circuit
would refuse jurisdiction on the very same case. These differing
results create a significant incentive for forum shopping. This
incentive may be particularly strong in the qui tam context because
the often widespread operations of government contractors provide a
broad range of potential forums and because a jurisdictional bar will
defeat an otherwise meritorious case. Recognizing the importance of
forum differences, at least one practitioner’s guide for qui tam
litigation specifically advises attorneys to forum shop based on the
public disclosure bar.59
Currently, the circuits employ a variety of tests. Some focus
heavily on the words of the statute while failing to consider
thoroughly the usefulness of the relator’s information to the
government’s case. Others focus more on the intent of Congress,
which has resulted in the addition of requirements not included in
the statutory language, namely, that the relator must be responsible
for any public disclosure. A uniform test would allow courts to more
effectively utilize the FCA by discouraging, if not eliminating, the
incentive for forum shopping and by making the jurisdictional
success of qui tam cases more predictable.

59. WEST, supra note 30, at 10–11 (“[T]he cautious lawyer will develop his or her case
and select a forum only after a careful review of the applicable case law.”).
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III. THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS (OR DOESN’T): ROCKWELL
INTERNATIONAL CORP. V. UNITED STATES
The facts giving rise to Rockwell presented several qui tam issues
for the Court to resolve, among them the quantum of direct and
independent knowledge necessary for a relator to qualify as an
original source. Although the Court never reached a holding on this
point, the majority’s analysis provides new guidance that should
resolve some of the ambiguity in the current jurisprudence.
A. Toxic Sludge and Pondcrete
In 1975, the United States Department of Energy hired
Rockwell International Corporation to operate the Rocky Flats
nuclear weapons manufacturing facility in Colorado.60 The
manufacturing process at Rocky Flats created toxic waste that
collected in evaporation ponds on the site.61 Relator James Stone
worked at the plant from November 1980 until Rockwell laid him
off in March 1986.62 While at Rocky Flats, Mr. Stone reviewed for
approval a project to dispose of the toxic pond sludge by mixing it
with concrete; he informed management that the project “would not
work” because the piping system for removing the sludge “would
lead to an inadequate mixture of sludge/waste and cement such that
the pond crete blocks would rapidly disintegrate . . . .”63 Rockwell’s
management disregarded Mr. Stone’s prediction and proceeded with
the pondcrete project, which successfully produced pondcrete until
“cost-saving” engineers cut the ratio of concrete to sludge in an
effort to increase production.64 The pondcrete blocks produced after
the change became chemically unstable and leaked toxins.65
In June of 1987, after Rockwell fired Mr. Stone, Mr. Stone went
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and informed the agency that
Rockwell had been violating environmental laws at Rocky Flats.66
After meeting with Mr. Stone to review his evidence, the FBI began

60. Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397, 1401 (2007).
61. Id.
62. United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 92 F. App’x 708, 714 (10th Cir.
2004) (reh’g granted), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1412.
63. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1401–02 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Id. at 1402, 1404.
65. Id. at 1402.
66. Stone, 92 F. App’x at 714 (reh’g granted).
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an investigation, and in June 1989, pursuant to a search warrant,
seventy-five agents from the FBI and the Environmental Protection
Agency searched Rockwell’s plant.67 The FBI disclosed the
investigation to news media three days after the search,68 and in July
of that year Mr. Stone, relying on original source status, filed a qui
tam complaint.69 He alleged, inter alia, that Rockwell committed
violations of various environmental laws and regulations and
fraudulently billed the government, including charging for pondcrete
that successfully stored the toxic waste when it actually leaked
toxins.70
While Stone’s claim proceeded, in 1992, Rockwell entered into a
plea deal with the United States.71 Rockwell admitted to various
violations of environmental laws and paid $18.5 million in fines.72
Following the plea deal, Rockwell moved to dismiss Mr. Stone’s qui
tam complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FCA
because the information in the complaint had been publicly disclosed
and Stone did not qualify as an “original source.”73 Rockwell argued
that the FBI leak triggered the public disclosure bar and that Mr.
Stone could not satisfy his burden of showing that he was an original
source.74 The district court held that Mr. Stone satisfied the burden
of showing that he was an original source because he had “direct and
independent knowledge that Rockwell’s compensation was linked to
its compliance with environmental, health and safety regulations and
that it allegedly concealed its deficient performance so that it would
continue to receive payments.”75
The United States then decided to intervene in the case, and in
November 1996 the United States and Mr. Stone filed a joint
amended complaint containing six counts against Rockwell.76 Mr.
Stone joined with the government only in count one, which stated a
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing Bruce Finley & Thomas Graf, Rocky Flats Illegally Burned, Dumped
Waste, U.S. Claims, DENVER POST, June 10, 1989; Sue Lindsay & Janet Day, FBI: Flats
Burned Waste Secretly, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 10, 1989).
69. Id. at 715.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 715–16.
72. Id. at 716.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id. at 716–17.
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claim under the FCA, and he asserted count six separately, which
alleged that Rockwell knowingly made fraudulent claims for payment
to the Government.77 A jury trial was held on counts one through
five, and in April 1999 the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs on count one.78 The trial judge awarded the plaintiffs treble
damages, as allowed by the FCA, of about $4.2 million.79 Had the
judgment at trial stood, Mr. Stone’s share could have been over $1
million.80 Rockwell would also have been responsible to pay Stone’s
attorneys’ fees, estimated at $10 million.81
Rockwell appealed the decision as to Mr. Stone being an original
source, knowing that if it were successful it would still have to pay
the entire civil award to the government but that it would not be
liable for Mr. Stone’s attorneys’ fees. The Tenth Circuit affirmed,
agreeing that Mr. Stone was an original source with “direct and
independent knowledge,”82 and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether the Tenth Circuit had properly
interpreted the FCA’s definition of an “original source.”83
B. Rockwell’s Holding and Dictum
The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit by a 6–2
majority.84 The Court’s opinion recounted the facts of the case in
some detail and then waded into the circuit court splits regarding the
FCA’s language.
The Court first decided that the phrase “information on which
the allegations are based” refers to the relator’s allegations and not
to the publicly disclosed allegations, which precludes the
independence test.85 The majority’s holding looked first to the
language of the act and then to “the sense of the matter”—in other
words, the Court considered congressional intent without directly
discussing it.86 The Court explained:

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 717.
Id.
Id. at 718.
Silberman & Innis, supra note 22, at 18.
Id.
Stone, 92 F. App’x at 711 n.6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397, 1401 (2006).
Justice Breyer did not take part in the decision. See Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1400–01.
Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1407.
Id.
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It is difficult to understand why Congress would care whether a
relator knows about the information underlying a publicly disclosed
allegation (e.g., what a confidential source told a newspaper
reporter about insolid pondcrete) when the relator has direct and
independent knowledge of different information supporting the
same allegation (e.g., that a defective process would inevitably lead
to insolid pondcrete.) Not only would that make little sense, it
would raise nettlesome procedural problems, placing courts in the
position of comparing the relator’s information with the often
unknowable information on which the public disclosure was
based.87

This line of reasoning has important precedential value because it
runs counter to those circuit courts that require an analysis of the
public disclosure in the independence inquiry. Indeed, the Court’s
analysis explicitly disavowed and effectively overruled the test
employed by the Fifth Circuit.88 Because the phrase “information on
which the allegations are based” refers not to the information
underlying the public disclosure, but to the information in the
relator’s qui tam complaint,89 any test of “direct and independent
knowledge” will need to examine what information the relator knew
as shown in the complaint.
Having made this determination, the Court next examined
which version of the complaint was relevant to the analysis. The
FCA’s language is unhelpful; in defining an “original source,” it
speaks only of the “information on which the allegations are based”
and fails to mention a complaint at all.90 Mr. Stone’s first complaint
had been amended several times, but in the final version, after the
United States decided to intervene in the case, it was reduced to only
two counts. Mr. Stone argued that the Court should consider the
allegations in his original complaint, but the Justices rejected this
argument in favor of including “at least the original complaint as
amended.”91 Appealing to logic, or “common sense,” the Court
asserted that to hold otherwise “would leave the relator free to plead
a trivial theory of fraud for which he had some direct and

87. Id. at 1407–08.
88. Id. at 1408 (citing United States ex rel. Laird v. Lockheed Martin Eng’g & Sci.
Servs., 336 F.3d 346, 354 (5th Cir. 2003)).
89. Id.
90. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2000).
91. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1408 (emphasis added).
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independent knowledge and later amend the complaint to include
theories copied from the public domain or from materials in the
Government’s possession.”92 The government objected to this
approach because of its fear that relators, after the United States
intervenes, “might decline to ‘acquiesc[e]’ in the Government’s
tactical decision to narrow the claims in a case if that would eliminate
jurisdiction with respect to the relator.”93 This argument proved
unpersuasive, because “[e]ven if this policy concern were valid, it
would not induce us to determine jurisdiction on the basis of
whether the relator is an original source of information underlying
allegations that he no longer makes.”94 In deciding Rockwell, the
Court was manifestly more concerned about prohibiting relators
from pleading sham claims in order to obtain jurisdiction than it was
worried about relators being denied a profit from their
whistleblowing if the allegations in an amended complaint became
too narrow.
Without delving into the meaning of “direct and independent
knowledge,” the Court determined that Mr. Stone’s knowledge fell
short of qualifying him as an original source.95 Having held that
“information” refers to the complaint as amended, the Court’s
analysis narrowed to compare what Mr. Stone had alleged with what
the jury actually found.96 The jury only found that false claims
existed in the period from April 1, 1987 to September 30, 1988, but
Mr. Stone’s only allegation relating to that period was that Rockwell
knowingly produced faulty pondcrete.97
The Court categorized Mr. Stone’s “knowledge” as a
prediction.98 According to his own evidence, Mr. Stone did not sign
off on the pondcrete program plans due to his opinion that Rockwell
could not successfully manufacture hard pondcrete. Rockwell did
actually succeed in making pondcrete, however, using the plans that
Mr. Stone had predicted would fail. It was only after Rockwell had
laid off Mr. Stone and other engineers reduced the ratio of concrete
to pond sludge that the blocks became unstable and began to leak
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 1408.
Id. at 1409 (quoting Brief for the United States 44).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1409–10.
Id.
Id. at 1410.
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toxins. Consequently, Mr. Stone could not have known that
Rockwell manufactured any faulty pondcrete, concealed its existence
from the United States, or billed the United States for solid
pondcrete when it actually leaked toxins.99 He did not have actual
knowledge of the violations that the jury found, but only predicted
such an outcome—based on an engineering theory that turned out
to be wrong.
The Court held that Mr. Stone’s “prediction” was insufficient to
qualify him as an original source.100 Without deciding that a
prediction could never qualify a relator as an original source, the
court held that a prediction does not satisfy the “direct and
independent knowledge” requirement “when its premise of cause
and effect is wrong.”101 The Court then also said that, “a qui tam
relator’s misunderstanding of why a concealed defect occurred would
normally be immaterial as long as he knew the defect actually
existed.”102
This analysis disregarded the role that Mr. Stone had in initiating
the lawsuit, instead focusing on the immateriality of his evidence at
trial to decide that Mr. Stone’s claims were irrelevant.103 As Justice
Stevens pointed out in dissent, however, it may fairly be said that but
for Mr. Stone’s report to the FBI, the investigation would not have
occurred.104 The circuit courts using the “independent” knowledge
tests would likely endorse this view, arguing that Mr. Stone’s
knowledge was independent because he was a source, or even the
source, of information that started the litigation. Additionally, Mr.
Stone would have satisfied the third requirement imposed by the
Second and Ninth Circuits because he was in the causal chain that
led to the public disclosure of the toxin-leaking pondcrete. In other

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 1404. The Court explained:
None of the witnesses Stone had identified during discovery as having relevant
knowledge testified at trial. And none of the documents Stone provided to the
Government with his confidential disclosure statement was introduced in evidence at
trial. Nor did respondents allege at trial that the defect in the piping system
predicted by Stone caused insolid pondcrete.
Id.
104.
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words, Mr. Stone blew the whistle105 and became the reason the
government discovered the fraud and recovered damages.
C. The Leftovers: Direct Knowledge and Predictions
With the holdings and analysis of Rockwell, the Supreme Court
has resolved some circuit court splits, but it has, perhaps, also
contributed to the confusion over the “direct and independent
knowledge” tests. The Court has effectively eliminated the separate
test for “independent” knowledge by holding that the independence
requirement looks only to the allegations in the complaint and not in
the public disclosure.106 The Court has also created the possibility
that a prediction can satisfy the requirements of the FCA to be an
original source through use of a cause-and-effect analysis instead of
applying a test for “direct and independent knowledge.”107
As the Fifth Circuit noted in United States ex rel. Laird v.
Lockheed Martin Engineering and Science Services Co., those circuits
that have defined “information” as referring to the allegations in a
qui tam complaint have not been able to define directness and
independence as “discrete and necessary concepts under the ‘original
source’ definition.”108 This issue should now be resolved because in
holding that “information” refers to the allegations in the relator’s
complaint, the Court deprived circuit courts of the ability to define
“independent knowledge” in terms of the information in a public
disclosure. Under the jurisprudence of the first two groups of
circuits, a relator’s knowledge had to be “independent” of the public
disclosure.109 As courts are now unable to look to the information in
the public disclosure, the separate test for “independent” knowledge
has no importance.
A Tenth Circuit case decided after Rockwell supports the view
that Rockwell’s methodology silences the “independent” test. In
United States ex rel. Boothe v. Sun Healthcare Group, Inc., the court
acknowledges that in some prior cases it had looked to the initial
105. See id. (“The search warrant . . . and the [FBI] affidavit that was released to the
news media . . . were both based, in part, on interviews with Stone and on information Stone
had provided to the Government, including his prediction of insolid pondcrete.”).
106. See id. at 1408.
107. See id. at 1410.
108. 336 F.3d 346, 354 (5th Cir. 2003).
109. See United States ex rel. Minn. Assoc. of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys.
Corp., 276 F.3d 1032, 1048 (8th Cir. 2002).
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public disclosure in deciding whether a relator qualified as an
“original source,” and admits that this analysis now “asks the wrong
question.”110 The court then follows the pattern of analysis suggested
in Rockwell, but without addressing the issue of prediction or
knowledge, by examining the relator’s knowledge against the
information in the complaint to determine if it is “direct and
independent.”111 Therefore, while Rockwell did not explicitly disfavor
the test for “independent” knowledge, its holding requiring that the
circuit courts examine a relator’s knowledge with the information in
their complaint and not in the public disclosure, has effectively
relegated the “independent” knowledge test to the past.
Circuit courts, now without a controlling precedent for the
definition of “direct and independent knowledge,” may either turn
to those circuits that have employed a combined definition or create
their own definition. Courts may also reconsider the Second and
Ninth Circuit precedents that require a relator to have been the
source of the public disclosure, which may now stand in the place of
the arguably defunct test for independence in the Sixth, Seventh, and
District of Columbia Circuits that required the relator to be the
source of information to the government.112 The “direct” tests
remain valid. As stated by the Tenth Circuit, “direct” knowledge is
“gained by the relator’s own efforts and not acquired from the labor
of others.”113 Similarly, “independent” knowledge is “not derivative
of the information of others.”114 In all the circuits, “direct and
independent” will probably now only impose one requirement: that
an original source must obtain the information underlying the
allegations in his qui tam complaint through first-hand efforts.

110. United States ex rel. Boothe v. Sun Healthcare Group, Inc., 496 F.3d 1169, 1175
(10th Cir. 2007).
111. See id.
112. The distinction between the two is subtle but does have ramifications, with the
“information” test being less stringent. Under this test, the relator need only be the source
relied upon by the government (perhaps as shown by having given information to the
government before the public disclosure was made), whereas under the additional test the
relator must actually have been the cause of the public disclosure of information.
113. United States ex rel. Hafter v. Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc., 190 F.3d 1156,
1161 (10th Cir. 1999).
114. Id.
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Based on the framework of the circuit splits laid out in Table 1,
Table 2 indicates the impact that the Court’s Rockwell holdings will
likely have on the circuit splits.
Table 2.115 Rockwell’s Projected Influence on “Direct And
Independent” Tests
Circuit
Court
Group

Test for
“Direct”

Test for
“Independent”

Test for
“Direct and
Independent”

6th, 7th, &
D.C.
Circuits

No longer
relevant

No longer
relevant

Relator has
first-hand
knowledge

3d, 4th,
5th, 8th, &
11th
Circuits

No longer
relevant

No longer
relevant

Relator
obtained
knowledge
without an
intermediary

10th
Circuit116

Relator has
first-hand
knowledge

2d & 9th
Circuits

Relator
obtained
knowledge
without an
intermediary

Additional
test

Relator
caused the
public
disclosure

Because the public disclosure bar is frequently litigated, it will
not be long before each of the circuit courts will have an original
source case. When that happens, the courts will have to decide what
quantum of “direct and independent knowledge” a relator must have
in order to be an original source.
IV. A THREE-STEP, A LA CARTE TEST
In addition to Rockwell’s impact on the current tests for “direct
and independent knowledge,” the Court introduced a unique

115. See McCubbins & Fitzgerald, supra note 19, at 124–25.
116. See Boothe, 496 F.3d at 1174–75 (10th Cir. 2007).
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analysis that circuit courts had not previously used: a cause-and-effect
test to determine if a prediction can qualify as knowledge. In
Rockwell the Court addressed the idea that “knowledge” may not be
as fixed an idea as first appears because it is possible that a relator’s
prediction can satisfy the statutory requirement of knowledge if that
prediction is correct.117 While the Court used this analysis because
the facts of Rockwell involved a prediction, the test may be integrated
with the “direct and independent” tests from the statutory language
to form a holistic approach to resolving original source status under
the FCA. A court applying a Rockwell three-step test would examine
each word in the FCA phrase “direct and independent knowledge.”
A court would determine (1) whether the relator’s information is
“knowledge,” (2) if so, whether the relator’s knowledge is “direct
and independent,” and (3) whether the relator’s knowledge is
valuable to the government investigation. Each step of the test is a
requirement to obtain standing as a relator under the FCA, not just a
factor.
A. Theorizing the Three-Step Test
The first prong of analysis springs from the Rockwell Court’s
reasoning that “[e]ven if a prediction can qualify as direct and
independent knowledge in some cases (a point we need not address),
it assuredly does not do so when its premise of cause and effect is
wrong.”118 A significant number of cases would not address this issue
because a qui tam relator often knows of a concealed defect, which
obviates the need to analyze a prediction.119 It is probable, however,
that this language will invite further qui tam litigation on the
subject, as scenarios for correct predictions abound, especially as
whistleblowers may turn information over to the government when a
project is in the planning stages.120
Indeed, the policy underlying the FCA encourages
whistleblowers to come forward as early as possible. Early
investigation or media coverage increases the likelihood of
preventing fraudulent activities from continuing. A large portion of

117. See Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397, 1410 (2007).
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to conduct an empirical study examining
the number of cases in which a prediction could be at issue in litigation under the FCA.
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qui tam litigation concerns health care services,121 and in these cases,
society may find it especially important to value a correct prediction
regarding a medical procedure as a matter of public policy to prevent
unnecessary surgeries or other medical procedures. Additionally,
given the technical engineering involved in many expensive
government research and development projects for the Department
of Defense, NASA, and other agencies,122 engineers in those
companies may be just as likely (or more likely) to have a prediction
about a technical flaw as to have actual knowledge of a contractor
billing the government for a defective product or service. But not
every prediction should be the foundation of a qui tam action; public
policy also demands a rule that does not overly burden the court
system with unmeritorious cases. The Court is right on this account;
analyzing a prediction’s cause and effect premise differentiates well
between meritorious claims and those that would merely burden the
federal district courts.
Rockwell’s holding provides a precedent that invalidates certain
predictions: those with incorrect premises as to cause and effect. The
Court did not hold that a prediction with a correct premise as to
cause and effect would satisfy the FCA’s requirement that the relator
have “knowledge.” The Court’s reasoning, however, elucidates the
fatal flaw in Mr. Stone’s case, and that reasoning may build a
complete test. Rockwell held that a prediction wrong as to cause does
not make a relator an original source even when it is right as to
effect.123 Mr. Stone did correctly predict the effect at issue in the
government’s successful litigation against Rockwell International—
faulty pondcrete—but he did not correctly predict the method, or
cause, of the failure. According to Mr. Stone, Rockwell
International’s machinery was incapable of producing working
pondcrete, but in fact, the machinery was capable. It was only when
too much water was added to the mixture that the resulting
pondcrete was unstable and leaked toxins. Thus, even though Mr.
121. See John P. Krave & Mark E. Jacobowitz, Doctored Claims, L.A. LAW., July–Aug.
2007, at 24, 24.
122. See, e.g., William A. Davis, Jr. & Edward B. Roberts, The Management of
Department of Defense Laser Research Contracts, J. OF BUS. 44, 44 (1970) (detailing the
technical nature of defense contracts, which has only increased since 1970); DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, PROGRAM ACQUISITION COSTS BY WEAPON SYSTEM, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 i–iii (2007) (listing the costs of unclassified research and
development projects).
123. Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1410.
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Stone correctly alerted the government investigators to check the
quality of the pondcrete stored at Rocky Flats, he could not have had
“knowledge” of the defect because his theory of its cause was an
incorrect prediction.124
This factual situation describes one possible scenario of four
cause and effect situations, explaining that the courts have no subject
matter jurisdiction to hear a publicly disclosed qui tam action if the
relator correctly predicted the fraud but was incorrect in predicting
why it occurred. The other three premise scenarios would be when
the relator’s prediction is wrong as to both cause and effect, when
the relator’s prediction is wrong as to the effect but rightly identifies
a cause for concern, and when the relator is right as to both cause
and effect.
The case of a relator whose prediction is wrong as to both cause
and effect is easily dispatched. Such a prediction would not qualify as
knowledge, for to hold otherwise would allow any prediction to
satisfy the test and would allow for a standard less than that already
established in Rockwell.
More difficult is the scenario when a relator’s prediction does not
come true, but the identified cause associated with the incorrect
prediction does correctly lead to the discovery of some other
fraudulent effect. Correctly alerting authorities to a faulty process is
meritorious, and the public could conceivably welcome a
whistleblower in this category as a well-intentioned hero who
succeeded in saving taxpayer dollars. The Court’s language, using
the typical phrase with the conjunction—“cause and effect”—could
be construed to mean that a failure of either the cause or effect
portions disqualifies the prediction as knowledge. This construction
is, however, perhaps too literal, but the Court’s reasoning
demonstrates that a performance of meritorious service for the public
is not part of the prediction/knowledge requirement.
Indeed, Mr. Stone was the instigator of the investigation into
Rockwell International’s fraudulent activities at Rocky Flats. His
prediction, right as to effect but wrong as to cause, presented
enough evidence for the government to obtain a search warrant.125
Three days after the resulting search, the warrant was unsealed and
124. Id.
125. United States ex rel. Stone v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 92 Fed. App’x. 708, 714 (10th
Cir. 2004) (“Using the information he had learned from Stone, Agent Lipsky sought and
received a search warrant to search Rocky Flats.”), rev’d, Rockwell, 127 S. Ct. at 1412.
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media coverage began.126 Thus, Mr. Stone successfully blew the
whistle on Rockwell International’s fraud at Rocky Flats. While this
argument was enough for the Tenth Circuit,127 the Supreme Court
rejected it because Mr. Stone’s prediction failed, and therefore was
not knowledge.128 Even if a whistleblower were right as to a theory
of cause and successfully alerted the Government to actual fraud
(albeit not the fraud predicted) a failed prediction still would not
qualify as knowledge.
A correct prediction, however, should allow the prediction to
qualify as “knowledge” for the meaning of the statute. A correct
prediction fulfills all the FCA’s policy goals for allowing
whistleblowers original source status, instigates and directs the
government’s investigation, and identifies the exact fraud to be
proved in court. The whistleblower offering a correct prediction
lacks actual knowledge that the prediction has come true, but this
lack of knowledge does not adversely affect the subsequent
investigation, which must confirm the relator’s allegation whether
that allegation is premised on a prediction or knowledge. Failed
predictions require an additional step that of the subsequent
investigation discovering additional information not part of the
original allegation. As such, in operation a relator’s allegation
functions identically whether it be premised on knowledge or a
correct prediction.
The matrix in Figure 1 displays Rockwell’s holding as well as
inferred solutions to the other three possible scenarios.

126. Id.
127. Id. at 724 (“[W]hether the alleged design flaws noted by Stone in his Engineering
Report actually caused the production of malformed pondcrete blocks is immaterial. . . . [T]he
relator need only show that he possessed direct and independent knowledge of the information
upon which his claim is based, not that his claim is factually correct.”).
128. See supra Part III.B.
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Figure 1. Cause and Effect Matrix for Predictions
Effect
Right

Wrong

Right

Qualifies as
Knowledge, Proceed
with Test

No Jurisdiction

Wrong

No Jurisdiction
(Rockwell)

No Jurisdiction

Cause

As shown in the matrix, if the relator failed to predict the right
effect, the relator would not advance a qui tam case on the merits
because there would be no fraud under the FCA. From Rockwell, we
know that if the relator’s prediction is right as to effect but wrong as
to cause there is no jurisdiction. Therefore, only when a relator
predicts fraud and is right as to both cause and effect, may it be
possible for the relator to be an original source.
The second and third requirements of the test derive directly
from Rockwell’s holding and prior qui tam holdings in the circuit
courts. As discussed in Part III.C, previous court tests in various
jurisdictions that discretely analyzed “direct” and “independent” are
no longer valid. Instead, Rockwell favors a single test that combines
directness and independence into a single analysis. The last
requirement, that the relator caused the media disclosure, would
remain valid in those jurisdictions that currently use it.
B. Applying the Three-Step in a Thought Experiment
This proposed test for “direct and independent knowledge,”
which incorporates Rockwell’s holdings and rationale, does not
operate as a true three-step test with mandatory consecutive
examinations. While the test does have three sequential steps,
depending on the circuit court and factual scenario, each step may or
may not be applied. Hence, I have also described this test as a la
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carte. A hypothetical illustrates how the Rockwell three-step test
would proceed with the question whether a prediction may qualify as
knowledge being addressed first.
An employee, Annie, works for a large defense contractor,
Microfraud. Annie reads an engineering paper and sees that the
manufacturing design is flawed because a microchip used in circuit
boards cannot function properly under the high temperatures that
will occasionally occur within the unit. She calculates that the faulty
chips will lead to one failure for every 1000 operations when the
contract calls for a tolerance of only one failure for every 10,000
operations. She duly brings her concerns to the attention of
Microfraud’s management, who appoint a team to study the issue.
The team confirms that Annie is probably right.
Mircrofraud management accepts the report, and internally
classifies the “flaw” as a pre-production estimate. Microfraud then
makes a “business decision” to ignore the flaw because all the
possible pre-production solutions would delay production and lead
to contractual penalties. Instead, management decides that
Microfraud will produce a correct part that meets the failure
tolerance requirement and have service technicians replace the
broken part with the correct part as failures occur. Management
reassigns Annie to another division to make room for a “team
player” on the project, and she loses access to the details of the
operation. At this point, Annie reports her prediction and
Microfraud’s management plan to the FBI, which initiates an
investigation. Microfraud manufactures the products, delivers them
to the government and bills according to the delivery. After the
government makes the payment, the FBI investigation progresses to
the point of discovering that Annie was right about the chips and
Microfraud has committed fraud in violation of the FCA. Reporters
with inside sources discover the FBI’s investigation and write news
articles about the incident, resulting in a public disclosure.
In this scenario, Annie, the whistleblower, has no actual
knowledge that the fraud occurred, but rather predicted that it
would occur and so initiated the investigation of Microfraud by
reporting the prediction to the government. If Annie then files a qui
tam complaint in district court, Microfraud will argue that the public
disclosure bar deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. If the
court finds that there has been a public disclosure, then the burden
of proof shifts to Annie to convince the court that she has original
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source status. The court will then have to decide if the employee had
“direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the
allegations are based.”129
In the circuits using a collapsed, joint test for “direct and
independent knowledge,” the question is whether the relator had
first-hand knowledge.130 Annie’s hypothetical describes a first-hand
discovery without an intermediary, but the court would have to
address whether or not a prediction is “knowledge.” The most
probable answer is that when the prediction is right as to cause and
effect, it is knowledge. In Rockwell, the Supreme Court indicated
that where there is direct knowledge of a defect, the relator’s
knowledge of the cause of that defect is immaterial.131 But as putative
“knowledge” shifts into mere prediction, causation becomes
increasingly material to the analysis because a correct prediction with
a faulty account of causation does not qualify as “direct and
independent knowledge.”132 The more correct the prediction’s
account of causation, the more likely that prediction can qualify as
“direct and independent knowledge.” Annie rightly predicted the
effect and correctly identified the cause of the failures in
Microfraud’s product, and therefore should be an original source.
An analysis of whether or not a prediction can qualify a relator as
an original source does not alter the qui tam jurisprudence in the
Second and Ninth Circuits. Courts in these jurisdictions would
follow the analysis of “direct and independent knowledge” as
previously described for the other circuits, but would include the
additional requirement that the relator be the source of the public
disclosure.133 Annie would succeed in obtaining original source status
by showing that her report to the FBI was a direct, or ultimate, cause
of the news reporters’ publishing the story. If we alter the
hypothetical so that Annie reported to the FBI but the news
reporters broke the Microfraud story on information from a third
129. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2000).
130. See supra Part III.C, Table 2.
131. See Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397, 1410 (2007) (“Of
course a qui tam relator’s misunderstanding of why a concealed defect occurred would
normally be immaterial as long as he knew the defect actually existed.”).
132. See id.
133. See United States v. Alcan Elec. & Eng’g Inc., 197 F.3d 1014, 1020 (9th Cir.
1999) (“[The relator] also had a hand in the public disclosure of allegations that are a part of
his suit, a third requirement for original source status.” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)).
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party, then the court would probably not hold that Annie was an
original source.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress intended the FCA to encourage whistleblowers to help
the government fight fraud via qui tam actions while preventing
parasitic lawsuits. Courts have struggled to interpret the language of
the statute. The complex split over how to apply the FCA’s language
of “direct and independent knowledge” evidences the difficulty
courts have had in determining if a relator is an original source. The
Supreme Court’s opinion in Rockwell should do much to clear up
some of the circuit court confusion. Although it did not directly
resolve the issue of how much “direct and independent knowledge”
a relator must have to qualify as an original source, the Court’s
holding that “information” refers to the allegations in the complaint
and method of analysis should provide significant guidance to the
circuit courts in resolving qui tam litigation. Courts analyzing the
original source question should implement a Rockwell three-step test,
basing subject-matter jurisdiction under the FCA on the following
determinations: (1) whether the relator’s information represents
knowledge, (2) whether his knowledge is “direct and independent,”
and (3) whether his knowledge is valuable to the government
investigation. This new structure will standardize the application of
the original source exception to the public disclosure bar of the False
Claims Act across the circuits, thereby lessening the incentive for qui
tam relators to engage in forum shopping, increasing the probability
that more suits will settle out of court, and producing a fairer
judiciary.
Matthew Lund
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